Introduction

Opportunity Meets Urgency
In late October 2014, Gabriela (Gabby) Franco Parcella, chairman, president, and CEO of Mellon Capital Management (MCM), and Kate Wolford, president of The McKnight Foundation, spoke to Bloomberg Business about the launch of an exciting new social investment product they believed would add another option for investors concerned about climate change. The joint venture was the Carbon Efficiency Strategy (CES), a portfolio in lower-carbon investments seeded by The McKnight Foundation that was the culmination of 10 months of intensive discussion and cocreation. It represented a landmark product for MCM and offered McKnight and other carbonconscious investors a more proactive way to shift institutional investments towards companies whose practices could reduce carbon emissions exposure in investment portfolios.
Parcella and Wolford share a commitment to innovation, and both are known and respected as open, collaborative, and risk-taking leaders. Working together to push the financial envelope and develop an investment product that could potentially yield social and environmental returns without sacrificing strong financial performance came as no surprise.
For Parcella and MCM, the CES developed for McKnight is consistent with the firm's 20-year history of meeting responsible investment mandates. Parcella describes MCM as a systematic manager "skilled in taking an idea and building a model that expresses it quantitatively." About the CES, Parcella comments, "We place our values 
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Capital had to build a new cross sector partnership that would change the roles of philanthropy and the private sector to develop new market-driven solutions -specifically, a Carbon Efficiency Strategy.
• Using a Deliberate Leadership framework, the case follows the partners' journey as they seek to build community and find collaborative solutions. We witness their tensions and evolution in their thinking and relationships.
• While the case seems unusual, it is represents future trends in which impact investing is a drawing a new pool of funders -beyond traditional grantmakers -into innovative social change solutions to address global Wicked Problems. In addition, next-generation family funders are moving away from geography-based communities to issue-based communities.
doi: 10.9707/1944-5660.1315 Petersen into three broad categories: global, insightful, engaged. The CES cuts across all three."
For Wolford and The McKnight Foundation, the CES represents another milestone in the Foundation's journey to, as Wolford says, "walk the talk" by aligning its programmatic and endowment investments with its mission to "improve the quality of life for present and future generations and…to use our resources to attend, unite, and empower those we serve" (McKnight Foundation). Wolford believes that the CES "helps fill a gap in the universe of investment products by demonstrating responsiveness to the demand by an institutional investor and sends a signal to the market about carbon emissions." The CES is expected to reduce the Foundation's emissions intensity profile in this particular investment account by more than 50 percent relative to investments with a more standard index exposure. This case study examines the challenges and lessons learned during the 10 months of development of the CES, offering these experiences to other innovators as they consider undertaking unexpected partnerships or building professional communities to create new financial tools or products that balance financial returns and social outcomes. When considering how changing communities impact the future of philanthropy, it is worth rethinking how communities are defined. The four organizations in this case came together, not just as partners in business but as allies working to change the financial sector, the community in which they work. As future funders continue to shift the investment priorities of corporations and foundations towards promoting social and environmental wellbeing as well as profit, impact investing can serve as a valuable tool for financial communities wanting to address large, complex issues like climate change.
It exemplifies how shifting priorities in philanthropy and the increasing focus on investment which promotes social and environmental wellbeing will shape collaborations between partner organizations working to address new challenges across the sector. (Rittel & Webber, 1973) . The concept includes many of the most challenging issues we face today, from global issues of poverty and climate change to local issues of failing education systems and lack of financial security and stability. There are no easy solutions to Wicked Problems, and though enormous progress can be made in alleviating them, they will remain with us. As John Fitzgibbon and Kenneth O. Mensah point out in Climate Change as a Wicked Problem, there is a "deficiency in our technical and social capabilities to be able to deal with a phenomenon with multiple sources, actors, stakeholders, cross-scale influences (externalities), and linkages" (Fitzgibbon & Mensah, 2012) .
Deliberate Leadership is a response to the challenges posed by Wicked Problems. It is a framework for leaders to use in tackling problems with no easy or consensus solutions. Each characteristic of Deliberate Leadership is based on proven business and social sector theories and practices. They are recognized leadership strategies used in creating lasting positive change within companies and organizations and in the lives of people most affected by the consequences of Wicked Problems. The Deliberate Leadership framework describes three phases of the process by which an organization learns and adapts in order to deal successfully with Wicked Problems. Moreover, learning is important at both the program and the operational levels; the reflection process must apply to both. 
Phase 1: Partner and Plan
When The McKnight Foundation first started thinking about a low-carbon investment strategy, Wolford reflects, "We didn't know what we didn't know." Still, McKnight had set the stage for the CES portfolio through an evolving commitment to impact and responsible investing paired with a long-standing programmatic commitment to the environment and addressing climate change through its longstanding support for environmental projects.
During a recent period when the McKnight climate program was modifying its focus, the Foundation's board was beginning to consider how to do more with its investments. The Foundation is intended to work in perpetuity, so investment returns are needed to support its grantmaking activity, which is at least 5 percent of assets annually. However, the younger generation of family board members wanted to leverage the rest of the endowment to address Foundation goals. This started a series of carbon exposure conversations between McKnight and MCM, with Mercer working as intermediary. MCM indicated that other clients and potential clients had asked similar questions, so perhaps now was the time to look into developing a product that would meet their needs for reduced carbon exposure.
McKnight gave MCM the first chance at building an investment product. If it came up with a good model with a fee structure in the range of the existing one, McKnight would consider seeding a fund. Kunkemueller shared with MCM that she had begun working with the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investment research team at Mercer and that they believed a potential collective fund in the lowcarbon space would have a lot of traction. This got the ball rolling.
While the partners in this scenario were all interested in working toward the same result and had built a trusted relationship over decades, the partnership was not without its tensions. One of these tensions was McKnight's inclusion of Imprint in the project in April 2014, after MCM and Mercer had already begun developing the model. Imprint had become a trusted partner to McKnight, but was less familiar to Mercer and not very well known by MCM. This shifted the dynamic, especially given the experience Imprint had in responsible investing and in social and environmental issues.
In addition, it quickly became clear to MCM and Mercer that they were not fully aware of McKnight's goals and priorities for the model, which resulted in revisions of the model that may not have occurred if these goals had been known from the start.
Phase 2: Act and Assess
Innovation Through Iteration
In early 2014, conversations to move product development forward began in earnest. Initial conversations in January 2014 between MCM and Mercer focused on processing the implications of the sample portfolio MCM had run excluding the CT200 and F15 companies. This led to discussions about the potential for a collective fund, something that could also be attractive to an audience beyond McKnight.
Initially, there were concerns about the data in the F15 and CT200, which were already three years old and relatively static. In addition, the product development team found both lists contained too much ambiguity with regard to company selection criteria, were potentially politically motivated, and included companies that had gone out of business. Karen Wong, managing director and head of equity portfolio management at MCM, suggested using MSCI, with which MCM had a strong relationship, rather than the F15 and CT200. However, MSCI only had data for a limited number of companies, which raised questions about the usefulness of the index for this project.
The process of developing the model was not always smooth, and the product development team's first two attempts at a model, which they called the Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy (CERS), turned out not to be quite what McKnight was looking for. Kate Wolford said, "It wasn't as robust as we had hoped, which was disheartening. It was simply a negative [investment] screen with weak data … Our investment committee, foundation staff, and Imprint were disappointed. I didn't think we were going to go forward."
When the team presented the second version of the model, McKnight also brought up the idea of taking coal companies out of the strategy entirely if it would not impact the tracking error. This was new and created a bit of frustration within the development team, and some tension among the consultants in terms of wanting to emphasize an executable investment model and also wanting a product with better data and a clearer investment thesis.
However, despite the additional work revamping the model would require of the development team and the existence of some confusion about what McKnight wanted from the model, MCM agreed to push forward.
As Wolford recalls, "To MCM's credit, they stepped up and said 'let's take another shot.' There was a good chance the CES would have ended there -but MCM staff believed they could iterate the right product for us. We agreed to go forward." Wolford continues, "The first thing we did was for each of us to begin by describing our needs and goals with the fund. In hindsight we should have set up a meeting with all involved, including Imprint, at the outset of the project. Fortunately, the relationship with MCM was strong enough that McKnight staff and board could voice their concerns, and Mercer and MCM were supportive about going back to the drawing board."
McKnight sent a memo to the team via Mercer on July 21 st . For the first time, this memo put to paper McKnight's goals for the strategy (R. Scott, 2014):
1. Overweight strong greenhouse gas performers and underweight weak ones using apples-to-apples industry sectors, based on relative performance not size.
2. Include strong integrated proxy voting and shareholder engagement.
3. Exclude coal.
The Carbon Efficiency Strategy
In August 2014, the development team presented version 2.0, the Carbon Efficiency Strategy. The strategy took two main approaches. First, it recognized strong climate performers through a reward and penalty system that assessed a company's environmental performance within its peer sector rather than by its size. For instance, financial companies would not be compared to energy companies because they are in different sectors. In this way, the strategy would address poor environmental behavior across the size spectrum on a relative basis using carbon intensity.
Second, it encouraged engagement through proxy voting on relevant issues and also promoted better company reporting through the weighting process. Underweighted companies would appear less attractive to investors, and, in theory, would be motivated to improve their reporting and other climate-relevant practices.
This time, the group agreed that the model was much stronger and clearly described its objectives and methodology. The index has now had its one year anniversary and there is one year's worth of data to indicate that that, yes, the CES does follow the index and does indeed serve the same purpose in the portfolio. Over time, Elizabeth McGeveran, McKnight's impact investing program director, expects to see the CES hew to the index, with no wild over-or under-performance. More broadly, McGeveran also wants to see interest in the product drive a demand for better data, which will lead to better information for decision-makers. But she also cautioned against a single interest in linear measures, "This is an ecosystem. We are making a contribution to an ecosystem."
All parties agreed that the product was a good start, but not perfect. Wong commented that, as the world evolved and the data improved, this product would change with it.
While it is too soon to tell if the CES will be successful in the long-term, the stakeholders are pleased with the product they developed and continue to receive positive feedback and interest from funders, investors, and investment firms.
Forging a New Path
This case offers valuable lessons for forming and sustaining diverse partnerships to address complex, Wicked Problems like climate change. First, while any new partnership will face challenges, communication and shared priorities go a long way in helping the partners to reach their goals. Second, it is important to have an understanding of differences between the organizational cultures of the various partners, as well as an understanding of the culture created by the partnership itself.
How Do Partners Learn to Work Together?
The MCM team faced internal skepticism when they began to develop the CES with McKnight and its other advisors. This may have reflected the natural circumspection and conservative outlook present in several areas of the financial sector. It may also have been a product of the field at that time, which was moving slowly into impact investing, an area considered by many to be high on hype, but lacking in quantitative outcomes (Ruttman, 2012 
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At the same time, BNY Mellon boutiques had the freedom to design and develop their own strategies and act upon them. While they pursue their goals within the broader leadership and mission of BNY Mellon, they also contribute a special brand of entrepreneurship to BNY Mellon as a whole, and MCM, especially under Parcella's leadership, is no exception to this dynamism.
With any new project, striking a balance between minimizing investment risk and fulfilling the social and environmental goals of the client can be tricky. MCM viewed McKnight (and foundation clients in general) as having a conservative risk profile. MCM at the time managed some of McKnight's most conservative investments. This meant finding the right nexus between a conservative investment perspective and the risk-tolerance needed to launch a new venture like the CES.
The work among partners was collaborative, even though there were many perspectives and organizational objectives in the mix. Partners had bi-weekly check-ins or spoke more often if the research and changes in the approach demanded it. Some strains were inevitable; Fontaine recalls the tensions when Imprint became more involved a few months after the work between Mercer and MCM had begun. Imprint was new to this table and brought more direct experience in carbon emissions investment strategies for foundations than did the other players. Imprint asked questions and played devil's advocate, which was difficult at first. At times the different partners weren't sure where their responsibilities ended and another partner's began. Eventually, the group worked through its "growing pains" and came together as a team. As Fontaine states, … there were times when tones were strained, and then there were times when the light came on, and everyone connected and came to an understanding, and we had new appreciation for each other.
The history between McKnight and MCM (as well as Mercer) helped frame this process as one of discussion and debate, not division.
With the CES launched, the concept now has strong support from across the BNY Mellon network and active interest from internal resources in helping the CES make a mark in the carbon efficiency space. It doesn't hurt that the other products from BlackRock and State Street came out soon on the heels of the CES. With more competition, BNY Mellon and MCM can see the expanding market for carbon efficiency and new opportunities for CES.
Does Culture Matter?
In addition to the market and mission drivers, there were other conditions that facilitated the development and launch of the CES. These were grounded in culture, leadership, and organization on the part of all partners. McKnight's Wolford explained it this way, First, was trust. We had worked with MCM for more than 28 years. We respected their capabilities and felt very comfortable telling them clearly what we needed to make this work.
Second, we had buy-in and commitment from our board, staff, and investment consultants-Mercer and Imprint Capital. Collaboration is an important part of our culture, we are inclusive, and we ensured that we were listening to concerns along the way. This included program staff and our investment committee.
Third was openness. We wanted a low-cost product that wasn't simply a negative screen. As the process progressed, we were able to share our concerns candidly, listen to the unique perspectives of others, and iterate to the best solution. We wanted to get it right because we believe that by our actions, the Foundation can signal to the market that an appetite exists for products that are more carbon efficient.
This culture of values and collaboration was mirrored at BNY Mellon and MCM, whose staff members wanted to ensure thoroughness and quality throughout the process. Wong touched on the importance of bringing products quickly to market, but also emphasized, On the other hand, an increase in impact investing may also reframe the way community grantees, such as nonprofits or small businesses, think about how they raise funds and the broader impact of their work, in particular, by considering not just how the money they receive is distributed throughout their budget but the social and environmental value they create through their work (The Bridgespan Group, n.d.). This is not to suggest that impact investing will ever replace philanthropy entirely, especially considering how new impact investing is as a concept. Rather, it offers a new source of funding for social and environmental programs, as well as providing private funders and corporations a way to engage in social change, from global efforts to small-scale community projects (Flower, 2012) .
Conclusion
With the CES, McKnight's Wolford sought to "to fill a gap in the universe of investment products." This was no easy task, and the partners knew from the beginning that this was a unique project that would be difficult to undertake. The process involved multiple partners, divergent interests, strong opinions, conflicting values, confusion about responsibilities, and a context that was both urgent (climate change) and reluctant (the traditional financial sector and the traditional philanthropic sector). The CES itself will allow the Foundation to exert more fully its leverage in the financial world by applying new tactics as a consumer of financial services, as an asset owner, as a shareholder of public companies, and as a leader in the foundation community. As McGeveran comments, CES … means we were looking for a way to reflect our thinking about what needs to be happening in the economy today in order to move towards a low-carbon economy tomorrow.
For MCM and BNY Mellon, the CES is a new product placed in a dynamic and expanding market. It also means new skills and abilities in ESG and social finance for the team and greater depth of experience working with nontraditional partners and communicating with clients about the future of responsible investing.
For Imprint, it demonstrates the value of specialized knowledge and the importance of exchanging ideas with others, perhaps even competitors, in order to create a new market-based solution for one of our most daunting social challenges.
For Mercer, the CES was an extension of its strong history in responsible investing. The development of the CES allowed the firm to further demonstrate its ability to help clients articulate their specific objectives, partner effectively with solution providers, and facilitate the process of honing an investment strategy to a mutually beneficial outcome.
While the final story about the impact of the CES is not yet known, the partners have already begun to benefit from what they have learned about collaboration, managing team conflicts, navigating internal resistance to change, exploring ways to blend financial and social returns, and mapping out a process for taking a new idea and shaping it into a market-ready product. The partners can now begin to ponder what's next?
